The Abuse of Occupational Licensing
Walter Gellhornt
Occupationallicensing is invariablyjustified as a means of protecting the public against incompetent and dishonest practitioners.
The effect of mandatory licensure, however, is often to restrict entry
into an occupation, thereby reducing competition among established
members. Professor Gellhorn finds ample evidence that the proliferation of pseudo professions has adversely affected occupationalmobility and economic competition, and warns that even such wellintended proposals as requiring the certificationof lawyers with specialized practices may have similar consequences. He concludes that
less restrictive forms of licensing should be employed to protect the
public againstshoddy or fraudulentservices without curtailingoccupationalfreedom.

In this bicentennial year devoted to celebrating American freedoms, literally hundreds of occupations are subject to licensing laws
in one or more states. Possibly the founding fathers knew of restrictions in some of the new American states on the practices of law and
medicine.' They would, however, have been aghast to learn that in
many parts of this country today aspiring bee keepers, embalmers,
lightning rod salesmen, septic tank cleaners, taxidermists, and tree
surgeons must obtain official approval before seeking the public's
patronage. 2 After examining the roster of those who must receive
official permission to function, a cynic might conclude that virtually
the only people who remain unlicensed in at least one of the United
States are clergymen and university professors, presumably because
they are nowhere taken seriously.
f University Professor Emeritus, Columbia University. The author is happy to have an
opportunity to join others in expressing esteem and affection for Kenneth C. Davis. Professor
Davis's influence and forceful expressiveness in administrative law are unmatched in America. He richly deserves the respect which this issue of the Review signifies.

I Wallace, Occupational Licensing and Certification: Remedies for Denial, 14 WM. &
L. REV. 46, 46 n.1 (1972).
2 In 1969 West Virginia was the foremost adherent to "free enterprise," with only 63
occupations subject to licensure. California was the most restrictive, with 178 licensed occupations; Pennsylvania closely followed with 165. K. Greene, Occupational Licensing and the
Supply of Non-Professional Manpower 17 (Manpower Research Monograph No. 11, 1969). For
a compilation of occupations subject to license, see id. at 51. See also Council of State
Governments, Occupations and Professions Licensed by the States (Pub. No. RM-422, 1968).
Federal occupational licensing also exists, as in radio operation and stockyard services. W.
MARY

GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL REsTRmAINTs

106 (1956).
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A consideration of the proliferation of occupational license requirements is especially timely because it may help in evaluating
two contemporary currents of public policy. First, prominent politicians and public officials assert that too much economic activity is
subject to regulation; they urge "regulatory reform," a code phrase
meaning the reduction of regulation. 3 Second, within the legal profession demand is mounting for some formal means of identifying
"specialists" among lawyers.
I.

THE BEGINNINGS OF "LEARNED PROFESSIONS"

At one time the learned professions were those of theology, law,
and medicine. Controversy will be avoided by accepting the hypothesis that theologians are and always have been learned. Considerable question may be raised, however, about the early belief that
lawyers and doctors were learned, except perhaps on a comparative
scale.
The American legal profession has been regarded as unassailably "learned" since the early immigrants set foot on Plymouth Rock
more than 350 years ago. In actuality, the expounders of law in those
distant times were small farmers and craftsmen who acted upon
vagrant memories of local customs believed to have been enforced
in England by some anonymous magistrate, coupled with notions of
propriety derived from the Bible. When the colonists in 1636 codified their laws, their compilation was, as the late Julius Goebel has
said, a "crude imitation of inaccurately remembered things.", The
same characterization can fairly be applied to legal developments
throughout the colonies, but the crude imitators and inaccurate
rememberers nevertheless maintained their status as learned. 5
In 1636 a law book is believed to have arrived in Plymouth. In
1647 the Massachusetts legislature ordered six books on law from
England-three of them by the same author-thus in a single stroke
adding to colonial learning about the law by some six hundred percent!
Being learned in the law continued for some generations to be
a popular pastime. A 1771 American edition of Blackstone's
3 See, e.g., J. Sims, State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws: The Justice
Department's View of Licensing, August 4, 1975 (address given before National Council on
Occupational Licensing in Virginia Beach, Va.)
' Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31
COLUm. L. REV. 416, 434 (1931). But see G. HASKINS, LAW AND AuTHoRrrY IN EARLY
MASSACHUSEIrs 4-8 (1960).
See C. HiLKEY,LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSErrs 65 (1910).
Id. at 65-66.
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Commentaries on the Laws of England had 840 subscribers.7 While
popular, the pursuit of legal learning was not particularly taxing.
Fifty-five years after the Blackstone edition, James Kent, Columbia's first law professor, began publishing his comprehensive
Commentaries on American Law-which ran to four volumes. In
1858 Abraham Lincoln recommended the reading of five named
books (not including Kent's) as "the best way" to enter the learned
profession of the law-though he did graciously add that no serious
damage would be done if one were to continue reading after having
begun practicing." Sustained and supervised study was certainly not
deemed to be prerequisite to becoming learned, for as late as 1900
one could be admitted to the bar in every state without earning a
law degree or even an undergraduate college degree
Columbia's School of Law was launched in 1858, the year in
which Mr. Lincoln offered his personal prescription. Columbia's law
library, supplemented by a whole shelf of books from the estate of
a recently deceased practitioner, went far beyond Lincoln's Big
Five. 0 Years later, when the school moved to more spacious quarters, it still housed its library in a single room, with one long table
surrounded by twenty chairs."
From that time onward, lawyers have increasingly exhibited
the symptoms of bibliomania. According to one historian of legal
literature, in 1810 every judicial opinion preserved in all of America
could have been published in eighteen large volumes; a century later
the required number of volumes had grown to 8,000.12 The typical
modern library adds to its collection that many volumes of serials
3
and continuations every year.
Many lawyers successfully resist the temptation to browse in
these rich pastures. Being already "learned" ex officio, having derived this status from professional forebears who were recognized as
learned long before books proliferated, some are seemingly content
to go on in the time-honored way; they allow eccentric brethren to
write or compile or even buy books, but they themselves avoid the
7 L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (1973). See also Schick v. United States,
195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904) (observing that "undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were
familiar with" Blackstone's work).
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 525.
'Id.
Io FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY,
BIA UNIVERSITY 45 n.9 (1955).

A HISTORY

OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUM-

" Id. at 75.
12 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 539.
,1 Kavass, Law Libraries of the United States: Development and Growth, 3 INT'L J.L.
LIBRIES 25, 35-36 (1975).
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tedium of reading them in numbers any larger than sufficed for
Abraham Lincoln and the framers of the Constitution.
The medical profession, too, achieved the status of being
"learned" when becoming learned was not burdensome. A century
ago President Eliot of Harvard remarked that in those days anybody
could "walk into a medical school from the street," and he added
that many who did walk in "could barely read and write." 4 In 1910
Columbia required beginning medical students to be high school
graduates, though a two-year college requirement had been
announced for the future. More than a third of then existing medical
schools demanded of their students "little or nothing more than the
rudiments or recollection of a common school education.""5 The
Columbia medical school's library in 1912 contained only 1200 volumes; after two generations that number had grown to about
350,000. The periodical literature is now so vast that nobody has
enough time to read even the abstracts which are meant to provide
up-to-date knowledge of what is being published in more extensive
versions; the computer supplants the printed page as a means of
keeping abreast of current developments.
These animadversions upon the unlearned past of professions
indubitably accepted as learned should serve as a reminder that
learning is an individual quality. It is not a quality inexorably possessed by everyone who obtains professional status. Many learned
persons may exist within a group that is far from learned. Before
recorded learning reached its present bulk, respected lawyers and
physicians earned high marks for the quality of their thinking even
though they had not read books descriptive of other people's thinking; today, some who have crammed themselves full of what passes
for learning have neglected to develop the sound judgment without
which learning cannot successfully be utilized. Early in this century
a famed professor emeritus of Columbia's College of Physicians and
Surgeons, speaking at a ceremony in honor of a deceased colleague
who had been a professor and practitioner in St. Louis, declared:
The men who worked and taught like him accepted willingly
the new additions to diagnosis and practice, but did not substitute them altogether for their old possessions. . . . They had
eyes in the tips of their fingers, and their most important instruments of precision were their brains and their practiced
"

A. FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION

IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

12 (1910).

Id. at 28-29. Of 155 American and Canadian medical schools in existence in 1910, only
sixteen required two or more years of college work to gain entry.
'
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eyes and ears. May the men who live now never forget that
there were great doctors more than fifty years ago.
In truth, possessing wisdom as well as erudition is what entitles a
person to be characterized as learned, and a calling becomes a
learned profession in more than name only when it is pursued preponderantly by persons who are both well educated and wise.
II.

THE PROLIFERATION OF LEARNED PROFESSIONS OR REASONABLE
FACSIMILES THEREOF

In recent decades occupational licensing has grown explosively.
One consequence has been a debilitation of the concept of a "profession" and a distortion of the idea that licensing should serve primarily as an instrument of social control to protect the public against
unfit or unscrupulous practitioners.
If occupational licensing resulted simply in downgrading the
word "profession" or in enlarging the ranks of the "learned," one
would have small cause for alarm. After all, the complexities of
modem life have created new demands for special training and perceptions. As long ago as 1955 a former Surgeon General of the
United States noted that nurses and other health aides are called
on to "master a body of knowledge greater in extent and usefulness
for the care of the sick than all of the medical knowledge of a century
ago. In addition, they have codes of ethics and possess techniques
as exact as those of the brain surgeon.""' So one can understand why
what had once been thought of as differences in kind between occupational levels are now often regarded as mere differences in degree;
precisely defining the word "profession" is by no means easy.' 7
W. GELLsoRN, supra note 2, at 107 (quoting Dr. Thomas Parran).
" One authority defines "profession" as
[a] high-status occupation composed of highly trained experts performing a very
specialized role in society. A profession has exclusive possession of competence in certain
types of knowledge and skills crucial to society and its individual clients. The special
intensive education and necessary discipline develops a strong in-group solidarity and
exclusiveness. Every profession, on the basis of its monopoly of knowledge and skills and
its responsibility for the honor and perpetuation of the profession, tends to feel that it
is by itself capable of formulating its ethics and judging the quality of its work. Thus
professional groups tend to reject the control of the public or clients they serve. Nevertheless, a profession is, of course, influenced by the public it professes to serve, and it is
shaped by the needs of other interest groups and by the demands of other professional
organizations.
G. THEODORSON & A. THEODORSON, A MODERN DICTrONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 316 (1969). Another
authority comments:
Like the aspiration of individuals to be thought virtuous, noble, pious, the aspiration to
be accepted as a profession sometimes encourages a good bit of humbug and a steady
"
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Licensing has done far more than simply gratify the understandable status-longing of semiskilled or specialized workers who,
in Professor Merton's words, "want to acquire at least the outer
appearance and preferably the inner substance of professional standards, values and education."1 8 It has also badly eroded the right
to work, one of man's most precious liberties.
Licensing has only infrequently been imposed upon an occupation against its wishes. Unwelcomed licensure has indeed occurred,
as when stockbrokers were brought under federal regulation in response to the financial scandals of 1929. In many more instances,
however, licensing has been eagerly sought-always on the purported ground that licensure protects the uninformed public against
incompetence or dishonesty, but invariably with the consequence
that members of the licensed group become protected against competition from newcomers. That restricting access is the real purpose,
and not merely a side effect, of many if not most successful campaigns to institute licensing schemes can scarcely be doubted. Licensing, imposed ostensibly to protect the public, almost always
impedes only those who desire to enter the occupation or "profesflow of false advertising. However, it is one of the tricks that social structures play upon
people that the most effective way to appear excellent or hardworking is to bustle about
while engaged in seemingly worthwhile tasks, that is, to take real steps in the direction
of excellence. As a consequence, the professionalizing occupations are moved to inaugurate programs for obtaining more talented recruits, establishing more rigorous standards
for entrance, raising the level of training, putting into force some codes of ethics, or even
initiating a university research program. Thereby they feel more justified in their claims
and also upgrade the quality of their professional performance. In short, the aspiring
occupations, while seeking their own goals of self-aggrandizement, are likely to make
genuine moves towards becoming a profession. Thus it is that occupations compete
among themselves-just as individuals do-for the available rewards of power, prestige,
and money.
W. Goode, The Professionalizing Occupations 98-99. (Columbia University Seminar Report
No. 6, 1975). See also W. GOODE, EXPLORATIONS IN SociAL THEORY 341-82 (1973).
" R. Merton, Some Thoughts on the Professions in American Society 7-8 (Brown University Papers No. XXXVII, 1960). The author notes "the spreading tendencies toward specialization in our society," and comments that "many of the traditionally non-professional occupations in business and industry seek to become professionalized. . . .We now hear almost
as much about the professionalization of commerce as about the commercialization of the
professions." Id. Another author notes:
In the United States, the word profession denotes almost all occupations which require
more training than those activities vaguely designated as unskilled or semi-skilled. For
general purposes, there is no apparent advantage in distinguishing between a business,
a trade, a vocation, and a profession. Such a distinction invariably becomes invidious
and is often made without logical basis.
Young, Universities and CooperationAmong Metropolitan Professions, in THE METROPOLIS
IN MODERN IAFE 290 (R. Fisher ed. 1955).
For a richly docdmented discussion of moves toward professionalization and specialization, see Wallace, supra note 1.
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sion;" those already in practice remain entrenched without a demonstration of fitness or probity. The self-interested proponents of a
new licensing law generally constitute a more effective political
force than the citizens who, if aware of the matter at all, have no
special interest which moves them to organize in opposition. 9
The restrictive consequence of licensure is achieved in large
part by making entry into the regulated occupation expensive in
time or money or both. 21 In Iowa, for example, a person who aspires
to ease the pains of those who suffer from bunions and corns must
have graduated from "a school of podiatry approved by the board
of podiatry examiners" and must then be examined, according to
the statute, "in the subjects of anatomy, chemistry, dermatology,
diagnosis, pharmacy and materia medica, pathology, physiology,
histology, bacteriology, neurology,. . . foot orthopedics, and others,
as prescribed by the board."'" This does indeed sound imposing.
One suspects, however, that the verbiage is of more benefit to bunion removers than to bunion sufferers.
In California a license to cut hair can be won only after the
completion of a long apprenticeship, graduation from a barber college, and success in an examination that in past years has demanded knowledge of such esoteric things as the chemical composition of the bones and the name of the muscle that is inserted in the
hyoid bone. 22 Illinois purportedly tests a would-be barber's knowledge of, among other things, physiology, electricity, anatomy, and
barber history.23 Fifty years ago not a single American state required
a barber to attend a tuition-demanding "college" for the equivalent
of an academic year. Now most of the states insist that new recruits
to the hair-cutting profession receive institutionalized instruction in
During his tenure as governor of New Jersey, Woodrow Wilson observed, "[M]en who
are behind any interest always unite in organization, and the danger in every country is that
these special interests will be the only things organized, and that the common interest will
be unorganized against them." 2 W. WILSON, PuBuc PAPERS 422 (R. Baker & W. Dodd eds.
1925). In contemporary political life one perceives an example of President Wilson's thesis in
the successful efforts of the "gun lobby" to block gun control legislation, which, according to
opinion polls, has widespread (but unorganized) popular approval. According to a 1975 Gallup Poll, 67% of the American public favors the registration of all firearms, and a like majority
of the public has favored such legislation for the past three decades. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1975,
§ 1, at 20, col. 4.
See Maurizi, OccupationalLicensing and the Public Interest, 82 J. POL. ECON. 399,
400 (1974).
" IOWA CODE § 149.3 (1971).
" Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-California,A RepresentativeExample,
18 STAN. L. REV. 640, 652-53 (1966).
B. SHIMBERG, B. ESSER & D. KRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES
148 (1973).
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bacteriology; histology of the hair, skin, nails, muscles, and nerves;
diseases of the skin, hair, glands, and nails; and other matters about
which one may venture to guess few barbers are consulted. Most of
the barber examining boards apparently draw their tests from a
small booklet published by Milady Publishing Company, which also
produces the textbook most barber colleges use because that single
volume apparently reveals everything their students need to know
to pass the examination.2 4 Plainly, a barber need not overburden his
mind with scientific or theoretical profundities. The costly and
time-consuming acquisition of artificial learning in a pseudo profession nevertheless blocks an occupational choice that might otherwise be available to the impecunious.
III.
A.

OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND COMPETITION

Irrelevancies as Barriers to Competition

Barbering has been used as a horrible example, but irrelevancies are by no means confined to any one of the new "professions."
Years ago a Wisconsin legislator, after examining some of that
state's occupational requirements, exclaimed sadly that as a practical matter, her child could no longer aspire to become a watchmaker, but fortunately could still qualify to seek the presidency of
the United States. 25 In some states virtually the only "profession"
open to a once-convicted felon is that of burglar; he is barred from
other activities because he is presumed to be a person of bad moral
character, regardless of the nature of the felony or its relevance to
his intended occupation.2 Until the courts finally called a halt,
24 Id. at 146. A New York cosmetology school boasts that 99.9% of its graduates pass the
state examination. The school's head "explained that throughout the year, students are
drilled on questions from a review book published by Keystone Press. This particular book,
he stated, contains about 90% of the questions that are likely to appear on the examination."
Id. at 150.
Doyle, The Fence-Me-In Laws, 205 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 89 (1952).
2, For a discussion of this kind of permanent disqualification, see W. GELLHORN, supra
note 2, at 128-29. Fortunately, some encouraging signs of change can be detected. For example, a recent New York statute forbids denial of a license because of a previous conviction in
the absence of a "direct relationship between one or more of the previous criminal offenses
and the specific license or employment sought" or "an unreasonable risk to property . . . or
the general public." 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 931. See also Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573
(S.D. Iowa 1974) (holding unconstitutional a statute which barred felons from all civil service
employment without taking into account the nature of the job or the felony). For more
extended discussion, see AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REMOVING OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS

(2d ed. 1973); H.

BANKS, S. SHESTAKOFSKY

& G.

CARSON, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF Ex-OFFENDERS

11-33 (1974) (Center for the Study of Legal Manpower Disabilities, New York); Meltsner,
Caplan & Lane, An Act to Promote the Rehabilitationof Criminal Offenders in the State of
New York, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 885 (1973); Note, New Approaches to the Civil Disabilities
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becoming a master plumber in Illinois took just a bit longer than
becoming a Fellow of the American College of Surgeons.Y
Some restrictions on occupational choice are blatant absurdities. For example, Georgia insists that those who seek to be commercial photographers must pass with flying colors a Wasserman test
for syphilis.2 8 At one time the Indiana Athletic Commission insisted
that boxers and wrestlers take a loyalty oath before being allowed
to enter the ring. 29 Silliness like this is probably not motivated by
anything so rational as a desire to discourage competition.
More often, however, the statutory constraints have had truly
exclusionary intent and effect. These constraints include requirements that licensees be citizens or residents of a locality. Although
these restrictions are probably unconstitutional,"0 they are enforced
until challenged. Some states insist that only an American citizen
can qualify to become, for instance, a pharmacist, chiropodist, tree
surgeon, embalmer, bill collector, or osteopath-evidencing a type
of xenophobia which reached a fever pitch in state legislatures in the
late 1930s when European refugees began arriving in large numbers
during a time of job scarcity. 31 Other laws provide that, regardless
of Ex-Offenders, 64 Ky. L.J. 382 (1976); Special Project-The Collateral Consequences of a
Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. Rav. 929, 1001-18, 1155-68 (1970).
2 People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1951). See also Note, Restriction of
Freedom of Entry into the Building Trades, 38 IowA L. REv. 556, 559, 561 (1953).
21 GA. CODE ANN. § 84-2315 (1975).
R. BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURrrY 118 (1958).

The constitutionality of citizenship requirements is too complex a matter to analyze,
or even summarize, in a footnote. Modem courts generally look askance at statutes which
make citizenship a prerequisite of doing or obtaining something with little functional relationship to citizen or alien status. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs., Archs., & Surveyors v.
Florez de Otero, 96 S. Ct. 2264 (1976) (license to practice as civil engineer could not constitutionally be withheld because of applicant's noncitizenship); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96
S. Ct. 1895 (1976) (barring aliens from federal competitive civil service positions violates due
process in the absence of an adequate justification); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(admission to the Connecticut bar may not be made to hinge on citizenship); Sugarman v.
Dougal, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (citizenship may not be made a prerequisite of eligibility for civil
service appointment in New York).
Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. LAw & EcoN. 93, 97 (1961). The manifest
irrationality of the citizenship requirement is emphasized by its inconsistent application. In
Texas, the law says that only an American citizen may be a barber, but any qualified person
may be a cosmetologist; Florida's law says exactly the opposite. In some New York cities,
only U.S. citizens may be plumbers, but noncitizens may install oil burning equipment. B.
SHIMBERG, B. ESSER & D. KRUGER, supra note 20, at 85. The matter has not escaped scholarly
criticism abroad. See, e.g., Altug, The Right to Work of Aliens in the United States, 18
ANNALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT D'INSTANBUL 269 (1962). The author, a well-known Turkish
law professor, concludes that despite steady improvement in the recognition of aliens' rights,
their legal status has been affected by statutes "inspired by too much nationalistic feeling
and economic competition." These statutes "contrast with American ideals of tolerance,
equality and hospitality" which are esteemed throughout the world. Id. at 317.
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of national citizenship, a licensee must have been a resident of the
license-issuing state for a substantial period of time-although the
relationship between prior residence and occupational qualifications may be undiscoverable, as in the case of optometrists, accountants, masseurs, and dentists. 2 One would suppose that lenses are
ground and teeth are cleaned in essentially the same manner in
different states, but the statutes pretend that one must have lived
within the license-issuing state in order to understand its citizenry's
needs. Occupational licenses have also been conditioned upon residency in political subdivisions smaller than a state. Twenty-eight
states provide for the licensing of plumbers, but in most of these
states the plumbers have managed to prevent licensing on a statewide basis. Instead, licenses are issued by the cities, which impose
municipal residence requirements aimed at excluding "outsiders"
from the local job market. 3 Some state laws authorize counties and
cities to say who may become an auctioneer, plumber, fortune teller,
lawn-sprinkler installer, and stationary engineer, among other
"professions" for which residence is made a sine qua non. 34 Outsiders, no matter how highly skilled or experienced, are barred by
reason of not being able to claim a narrowly localized experience.
Americans have traditionally thought themselves free to pursue
happiness wherever it might be found. Mobility-lateral as well as
11Note, Residence Requirements afterShapiro v.

Thompson, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 134, 148-

52 (1970). In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Supreme Court struck down
statutes which made prior residence a condition of eligibility for public welfare benefits. The
law of residence requirements does, however, have convolutions. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972), the Court held that eligibility to vote could not be postponed by durational
residency requirements functionally unrelated to the prevention of vote fraud. In Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the Court held unconstitutional a statutory
requirement of a year's residence within the state before a patient could become eligible for
treatment in a public hospital at the expense of the local government. On the other hand, in
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Court held that a state need not open its courts to
petitioners for divorce, until "residence" had been firmly established. See Keeffe, Sticking
It Out Fora Year: Iowa's Residency Requirement,62 A.B.A.J. 922 (1976). See generally Note,
DurationalResidence Requirements from Shapiro through Sosna: The Right to Travel Takes
a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 622 (1975). And in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 96 S. Ct. 1154, 1155 (1976), the Court upheld as a "bona fide continuing residence
requirement" a rule that employees of a municipal fire department must be residents of the
city. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S. 950 (1972), dismissing
appeal from 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971); Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 1048 (1975). See also
Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (sustaining
a one-year residency requirement as a prerequisite to qualifying for tuition benefits in a state
university); Annot., 37 L. Ed. 2d 1056 (1973).
3 B. SHIMBERG, B. Ess.R & D. KRUGER, supra note 23, at 69.
34 See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 546.1, 368.6, 368.8, 368.45 (1971). See also B. SHIMBERG, B.
ESSER & D. KRUGER, supra note 23, at 67, 82; Note, OccupationalLicensing: An Argument
for Asserting State Control, 44 NOTRE DAE LAw. 104, 109-12 (1968).
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upward and sometimes downward-has been a characteristic of our
society, and most of us think it has made for a healthier country,
one in which parochialism has yielded to the inflow of new populations, new ideas, new techniques. Local licensure tends in the opposite direction, toward enclosure within fixed boundaries. Requirements unrelated to suitability and proficiency probably will not
withstand judicial scrutiny, but until a frustrated applicant chooses
to take a case to court-or until conscientious legislators repeal
obnoxiously discriminatory statutes-the bad laws remain as
threats to occupational freedom.
All reasonably sophisticated persons know that a well-knit special interest group is likely to prevail over an amorphous "public"
whose members are dispersed and, as individuals, are not in sharp
conflict with the organized interest.35 Of course many special interests perceive themselves as nurturers of the public interest rather
than as self-seekers. The line between the common weal and one's
own is not always easily drawn. But occupational licensing has typically brought higher status for the producer of services at the price
of higher costs to the consumer; 6 it has reduced competition; 7 it has
narrowed opportunity for aspiring youth by increasing the costs of
entry into a desired occupational career; 38 it has artificially segSee W. WILSON, supra note 19. Professor Milton Friedman has observed:
The declaration by a large number of different state legislatures that barbers must be
approved by a committee of other barbers is hardly persuasive evidence that there is in
fact a public interest in having such legislation. Surely the explanation is different; it is
that a producer group tends to be more concentrated politically than a consumer
group. . . . [P]eople in the same trade, like barbers or physicians, all have an intense
interest in the specific problems of this trade and are willing to devote considerable
energy to doing something about them. On the other hand, those of us who use barbers
at all, get barbered infrequently and spend only a minor fraction of our income in barber
shops. Our interest is casual. Hardly any of us are willing to devote much time going to
the legislature in order to testify against the iniquity of restricting the practice of barbering. . . . The public interest is widely dispersed. In consequence, in the absence of any
general arrangements to offset the pressure of special interests, producer groups will
invariably have a much stronger influence on legislative action and the powers that be
than will the diverse, widely spread consumer interest. Indeed, from this point of view,
the puzzle is not why we have so many silly licensure laws, but why we don't have far
more. The puzzle is how we ever succeeded in getting the relative freedom from government controls over the productive activities of individuals that we have had and still
have in this country, and other countries have had as well.
M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 143 (1962). See also Maurizi supra note 16, at 399.
' Maurizi, supra note 16, at 399-403.
" See Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, FTC, 1976 Federal Trade Commission
3

Budget Overview, 32

ANTITRUST

& TRADE

REG. REP.

(BNA) Al, D1-D2 (Dec. 24, 1974). See

also J. Sims, supra note 3.
11 Maurizi notes that often the examination process is made unduly burdensome, as, for
example, by conducting examinations at only one city within a large state.
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mented skills so that needed services, like health care, are increasingly difficult to supply economically;39 it has fostered the cynical
view that unethical practices will prevail unless those entrenched in
a profession are assured of high incomes;4" and it has caused a proliferation of official administrative bodies, most of them staffed by
persons drawn from and devoted to furthering the interests of the
By sometimes requiring applicants to bring all their own tools and equipment to the
examining station, the agency adds a considerable cost to some applicants. Some cosmetologists, for example, must bring their own human model; some truck drivers must
bring their own trucks. Furthermore, in some occupations knowledge about what applicants must do to pass the examination is difficult to obtain; plumbers' examinations are
so unpredictable that applicants often must take the exam once (figuring to fail it) in
order to find out what it is like.
Maurizi, supra note 16, at 400 n.1.
1,[Licensing laws have become] major obstacles to the expansion of the functions
of health personnel and to the effectuation of innovations or developments in the uses
of new or existing personnel .
Fifteen different [health-care] professions require a license to practice and are
directly affected by the licensure laws ...
The increasing number of licensed health groups leads to the creation of overlapping
areas of practice artificially separated by the structuring of health personnel into narrow
functions. The increases in the number of licensed categories make it increasingly difficult to define who can best provide given types of care and treatment ...
[Llicensure, originally designed to protect the public, has been to a considerable
degree transformed into a means of professional control leading to the protection of
professional interests.
ContemporaryStudies Project:Regulation of Health Personnelin Iowa - A Distortion of the
Public Interest, 57 IowA L. REV. 1006, 1007, 1013, 1014 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
[Hospitals] must have some freedom to use personnel in flexible work arrangements.
Job changes, job enlargement, and job upgrading all require flexibility in manpower
education and use.
• . .The shortages of licensed personnel, as defined by the law, encourage violations
of the law by both employers and employees. In fact, strict compliance with the law
would close many hospitals.
Egelston & Kinser, Licensure of Hospital Personnel, HOSPITALS, Nov. 16, 1970, at 35, 37,

quoted in B.

SHIMBERG,

B. EssER & D.

KRUGER,

supra note 23, at 16-17.

Professor Friedman notes:
[Members of the medical profession do not] deliberately go out of their way to limit
entry in order to raise their own incomes. That is not the way it works. Even when such
people explicitly comment on the desirability of limiting numbers to raise incomes they
will always justify the policy on the grounds that if "too" many people are let in, this
will lower their incomes so that they will be driven to resort to unethical practices in
order to earn a "proper" income. The only way, they argue, in which ethical practices
can be maintained is by keeping people at a standard of income which is adequate to
the merits and needs of the medical profession. I must confess that this has always
seemed to me objectionable on both ethical and factual grounds. It is extraordinary that
leaders of medicine should proclaim publicly that they and their colleagues must be paid
to be ethical. And if it were so, I doubt that the price would have any limit.
O

M.

FRIEDMAN,

supra note 35, at 152.
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licensed occupations themselves. 41
Moreover-and this is a point largely unnoticed-members of
ethnic minorities are systematically discouraged from becoming licensees by irrelevant requirements. Licensing tests are often administered solely in English, so that Spanish-speaking citizens and
foreign-born residents encounter special difficulty. 2 In some instances, indeed, written tests may be altogether inapposite means of
determining whether an applicant possesses a requisite degree of
skill.43 Many economically deprived young people cannot easily
meet the qualifications demanded of applicants, such as paying
tuition to pseudo-professional schools or undergoing needlessly prolonged periods of apprenticeship. Recent years have seen hard won
progress in overcoming racial discrimination in private employment. Discrimination, as the courts have found, has been strongly
reinforced by ostensibly objective tests which are actually unrelated
to successful job performance, and employers have been ordered to
abandon this kind of testing.4 4 The time is ripe for those who care
1'One

study notes:
In forty-four of the American states, for example, members of the state boards of nursing
are chosen solely from nominees of the state nursing associations. It is not thought proper
to select those who regulate public utilities from nominees of the utility companies or
an insurance commissioner from nominees of the insurance companies ...
It is typical for a state to have more than 150 statutorily established boards, commissions, agencies, councils and committees. It is futile to expect a Governor to be able
to coordinate the activities of such an array of units.
Holmer, The Role and Functioningof State Licensing Agencies, 40 STATE GOV'T 34, 35-36
(1967). On April 1, 1976, New York became the proud possessor of two new professions,
subject to nominally official regulation. The State Board for Occupational Therapists consists
of seven therapists, a hospital administrator, a physician, and one "public representative."
The State Board for Speech Pathology and Audiology consists of three audiologists and four
speech therapists. N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 7901-03, 8201-05 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See also W.
GELLHORN, supra note 2, at 140-44; J. LIEBERMAN, THE TYRANNY OF THE EXPERTS 252-54 (1970).
For a somewhat more sympathetic analysis of licensing boards, see Liebmann, Delegation to
Private Partiesin American ConstitutionalLaw, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 704-09 (1975).
12 K. Greene, supra note 2, at 6.
For example, in 1937, North Carolina enacted a statute barring anyone other than a
licensed tile layer from engaging in the business of laying ceramic tiles. Two decades later,
in the words of one commentator, the "tile laying establishment was fatally hit by a semiliterate, unlicensed youth" who had flunked the licensing examination. J. LIEBERMAN, supra
note 41, at 11. In Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957), the licensing board was
restrained from enforcing the law. The court noted the applicant's poor spelling and defective
syntax on the written exam, but found his lack of command of written English to bear no
relevance to his skill as a tile layer. "Successful tile contracting consists in doing the work
rather than describing it in a written examination. In all probability the average worker could
learn to do acceptable tile work as quickly as he can learn to describe it on paper." Id. at
522, 96 S.E.2d at 857.
" See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Duhon v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 494 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1974).
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about social justice to attack licensing regulations which, with all
the force of government, authorize similarly obnoxious entry examinations and thus achieve discrimination behind the facade of protecting the public.
B.

Limits of Antitrust Remedies

Present antitrust laws may be ineffective in overcoming the
significant anticompetitive consequences of laws that make access
to an occupation burdensome and impose restraints upon those who
have managed to gain a license. In 1943 the Supreme Court held
that the antitrust statutes are aimed at private, not state, action,
and ruled that a California statute constricting the competitive
marketing of raisins immunized behavior the antitrust laws would
otherwise have forbidden. 5 Although the force of the case has diminished because courts have sometimes been inattentive to its doctrine, Professor Verkuil has argued with great effectiveness that it
deserves to be respected.
Although presumably disdainful of substantive due process,
the federal courts have seized upon another approach to oversee state economic regulation. Increasingly, the challenge to
occupational licensing and price fixing by state regulatory bodies has come in the form of application of the antitrust laws to
the offensive conduct. . . . One tends initially to applaud this
aggressive antitrust posture as a welcome corrective to a runaway regulatory problem. Upon further reflection, however,
those who oppose substantive economic review of state activity
under the due process clause should doubt the advisability of
engaging in antitrust review of that same activity, and for precisely the same reasons. . . . The ultimate consequences of
heedless application of the antitrust laws to state regulatory
schemes could well be a crisis in federalism not dissimilar to
that created by the Supreme Court in the 1930's ...
[Parker v. Brown] vindicated the overriding principle of
the 'constitutional revolution of 1937' that the states should be
free to make their own economic decisions, whether or not they
comport with the economic principles in vogue with the federal
judiciary. 6
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 328, 329-30, 334 (1975) (footnotes omitted). See also Verkuil, Preemptionof
State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976 DUKE L.J. 225 (1976).
"

'
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Somewhat similarly, Professor Handler concludes that the doctrine of Parker v. Brown is "integral to our federalism." He favors
"endowing the states with broad latitude in their economic experiments," turning to the states
as the forum for the correction of the mischief that inevitably
arises under any system of social control. This may not lead to
the best of all possible worlds but neither will the various proposals for the curtailment of Parker . . . . [T]he preservation
of our federalism overrides whatever benefits might flow from
extending the reach of antitrust by limiting the ambit of the
47
state action defense.
Even a reinvigoration of the state action defense should not,
however, bar the use of antitrust laws against restrictive practices
adopted voluntarily within a licensed occupation. The antitrust
laws may not reach an anticompetitive economic policy embedded
in a state's statute, but they can and do reach anticompetitive
policy choices made by licensees, perhaps without a state's opposition and yet not by its direction. A state must command, not merely
permit, a restraint of trade in order to immunize it against federal
antitrust laws.
This lesson was taught the legal profession in 1975, when the
Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar48 held that a bar
association's minimum fee schedule violated the Sherman Act's
prohibition of combinations in restraint of trade.4 9 How often the
lesson may have to be taught to others remains to be seen. The
occupational licensing statutes to which this article has been addressed tend to reduce competition, but they rarely acknowledge
this to be their purpose-and even less often do they direct licensees
to submit to explicitly anticompetitive controls for monopolistic
purposes. The restrictive practices of licensed groups are usually
designed within the groups, rather than imposed on them from the
17 Handler, The Current Attacks on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 20 (1976). Professor Handler comments on "Professor Verkuil's excellent
analysis of the relationship between the substantive due process cases and the Parker doctrine-a relationship which I believe he was the first to perceive. . . . His unique piece of
scholarship should cause those who advocate a headlong and wholesale retreat from Parker
to stop, look, and listen before breaching the basic tenets of the federalism upon which rests
our constitutional form of government." Id. at 7 n.35.
' 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975); see Comment, 7 Lov. U.L.J. 254 (1976).
" See also Glenn, Minimum Fee Schedules for Attorneys as Constituting Violation of
Sherman Act, 44 L. ED. 2D 818 (1976). For the most recent interpretation of the application
of the Parker v. Brown doctrine, see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
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outside. To the extent that this is so, Parker v. Brown" gives no
protection against the antitrust laws, for the Supreme Court has
differentiated between state action and private action wearing a
mask.5 1
IV.

LAWYERS, SPECIALIZATION, AND CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

The prudence as well as the legality of recent proposals to categorize lawyers and to require their periodic participation in formal
educational programs may be questioned. The specialization issue
is likely to prove difficult. As a result of the Goldfarb case and
controversy concerning other groups' restraints upon the advertising
of services and costs, 2 the legal profession has cautiously modified
its traditional insistence that speaking about oneself in a tone
louder than a whisper is unethical.5 3 In 1976 for the first time the
American Bar Association voted that a lawyer should be permitted
to indicate "in dignified form" in professional announcements and
in the yellow pages of telephone directories his preferred areas of
practice and his educational background.5 4 The Association frowns
317 U.S. 341 (1943).

Id. at 351; Comment, OccupationalLicensing: An Antitrust Analysis, 41 Mo. L. REv.
66, 72-76 (1976).
52 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 96
S. Ct. 1817 (1976); Benham & Benham, Regulating Through the Professions:A Perspective
on Information Control, 18 J. LAW & EcoN. 421 (1975); Benham, The Effect of Advertising
on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 337 (1972). The Federal Trade Commission
has announced an investigation of practices by private optometrist associations which restrict
price information available to the public. Federal antitrust proceedings have been initiated
against associations of accountants, anesthesiologists, architects, physicians, and realtors,
among others, because of their controls over fees and advertising. Kohlmeier, PriceFixing in
the Professions, N.Y. Times, April 18, 1976, § 3, at 3, col. 1.
The unethicality of advertising has long been an article of faith among professionals,
and the courts have generally shared this faith. See, e.g., Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (involving prohibition of dentists' advertising). In that
case Chief Justice Hughes remarked, "What is generally called the 'ethics' of the profession
is but the consensus of expert opinions as to the necessity of such standards." Id. at 612. But
see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817,
1832 n.25 (1976). See also In re Cohen, 216 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495 (1928); Comment,
Advertisement and the Bar, 1 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 179 (1976).
11ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-102 (A)(5)-(6); see House
Broadens Code's "Publicity in General" Rules at Midyear Meeting in Philadelphia,62
A.B.A.J. 470 (1976). The ABA still frowns upon resort to advertising in newspapers or other
mass media to inform the public about a lawyer's eagerness (and supposed ability) to render
service. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-101. Even the mild
ABA "reform" was deemed to be unacceptable by the Virginia Supreme Court, which refused
to modify its rules to conform to the new standards. 44 U.S.L.W. 2508 (May 4, 1976).
As this article was being prepared for publication, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a
case involving both antitrust and first amendment challenges to state restrictions on lawyers'
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upon a lawyer's identifying himself as a "specialist" unless he has
met the requirements of a state program of certification. 5
Whether, when, and how lawyers should be allowed to assert
that they have special qualifications are still unresolved questions.
Genuinely high-minded and disinterested persons have urged that
formal identification of specialists is needed to protect uninformed
laymen against incompetent, inefficient, or inadequately experienced lawyers who may disserve their clients' best interests. They
think that lawyers should emulate doctors in drawing more distinct
lines than now separate specialists and general practitioners.
Thirty-three varieties of medical specialists can now be recognized because they have achieved "board certification."5 6 A licensed
physician who wishes to be formally identified as equipped to practice in one of these thirty-three areas of specialization must complete additional training and survive an examination by the certifying agency, composed of persons already certified. To be sure, certification is not a prerequisite of a generalist's performing a specialist's task. Many hospitals, however, make their facilities available
only to those who possess board certification, and thus the incentive
7
to gain board approval has been strong in the medical profession.1
Everyone within the legal profession knows that specialization
exists. Attorneys are frequently and familiarly identified, by their
colleagues in the profession and by themselves, as tax lawyers or
commercial lawyers or corporate lawyers or labor lawyers or communications lawyers or criminal lawyers or divorce lawyers-the list
could be elongated far beyond the thirty-three specialists the doctors have proclaimed. A question of lively interest to the profession
advertising. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 555 P.2d 640 (Ariz.), prob. juris noted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3203 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976).
" A gentle critic has pointed out in an American Bar Association publication that even
in legal directories (which, typically, are little known by laymen) lawyers are not allowed to
provide very much information about themselves.
For example, a lawyer cannot indicate his area of expertise unless he qualifies as a
specialist under state standards; he cannot mention how many cases he has handled of
a particular type or for how many year's; he may say he has an LL.M., but he may not
add the words "in taxation"; he may not indicate experience by reference to a specialized
tribunal, such as "practice before the ICC"; he may not ever say "former chairman of
the ABA Indian Affairs Committee."

Hobbs, Lawyer Advertising: A Modest Proposal, ALTERNATIVES:

LEGAL SERVICES AND THE

PUBLIC, February, 1976, at 3-4. See also Smith, Making the Availability of Legal Services
Better Known, 62 A.B.A.J. 855 (1976).
-1 Mindes, Lawyer Specialty Certification: The Monopoly Game, 61 A.B.A.J. 42, 43
(1975).
f See Rayack, Restrictive Practicesof Organized Medicine, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 659, 70102 (1968). See also Mindes, supra note 56, at 43.
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is whether the de facto specialization of today, acquired freely either
by explicit design or simply through the vicissitudes of practice,
should in the future be attested through certification. Tension exists
between the laudable desire to ensure the efficient rendition of professional services to clients and the not necessarily intended likelihood that certification will reduce competition among lawyers, discourage well qualified but uncertified persons from performing functions within the zone of a "specialization," and thus increase the
costliness of legal services.58 Were no lawyer permitted to identify
himself as equipped to engage in a special type of practice until he
had been certified, exclusivity would be powerfully stimulated.',
This seems the probable outcome if formal certification spreads
widely.
The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the
many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure
from a sharp weapon of public defense into a blunt instrument of
self-enrichment. Perhaps instead of continuing toward specialist
certification, the bar should permit each member to inform the
public, if the member chooses, about the kinds of legal service he
or she is prepared to render." Misrepresentation of qualifications or
demonstrated incompetence should of course be deemed cause for
disciplinary action.6 ' Proceedings aimed at individual malefactors
For an unflattering estimate of what certification is likely to accomplish for consumers
of services, see J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 36, at 248-51. Professor Friedman, proceeding on the
assumption that specialist certification would not legally bar uncertified persons from practicing within an occupation, writes:
[I]f,
in certifying newcomers, members of the trade impose unnecessarily stringent
requirements and reduce the number of practitioners too much, the price differential
between certified and non-certified will become sufficiently large to induce the public
to use non-certified practitioners. In technical terms, the elasticity of demand for the
services of certified practitioners will be fairly large, and the limits within which they
can exploit the rest of the public by taking advantage of their special position will be
rather narrow.

M.

FRIEDMAN,

supra note 35, at 149.

11For discussion of this possibility, see Tyler, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar: The Professions are Subject to the Sherman Act, 41 Mo. L. Rsv. 1, 30-31 (1976). See also Mindes, supra
note 56. But see also Brink, Let's Take Specialization Apart, 62 A.B.A.J. 191 (1976).
'o One commentator recommends:
1. Specialty. At present a lawyer can only state in a directory that he concentrates
or limits his practice to certain fields. This should be broadened to permit one to say
what kind of case he will accept, as is now common in lawyer referral programs.
2. Qualifications. The present limitations should be broadened at least to let lawyers say how long they have been practicing in the field, and the bar associations should
be urged to develop a fuller system for permitting lawyers to state their experience and
other qualifications.
Hobbs, supra note 55, at 5.
" See W. GELLHORN, supra note 2, at 149-50.
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or bumblers might more meaningfully protect the public than would
the creation of clusters of self-anointed specialists. In the past lawyers have been backward about taking steps against unworthy
members of their own profession. This seems to be characteristic of
professional people in general; they criticize one another's shortcomings in private, but are rather resistant to disciplining the unfit
and the unscrupulous in public proceedings. If, however, the professions are to continue to enjoy the autonomy they so highly prize,
they will have to accept more fully the responsibility implicit in a
privileged status.
The advocacy of mandatory continuing legal education, sometimes linked with proposals concerning specialist certification, has
also become clamorous. Four states have already approved mandatory systems intended (as their proponents say) to maintain high
levels of professional competence; similar plans are said to be under
serious consideration in more than half the states.6 2 A common feature of the plans is that all licensed lawyers must annually enroll
for a stated number of hours in formal course work, in programs
approved by a state supervisory body.
The efficacy of this kind of compulsory education is dubious.
Advocates of forced schooling have at times ignored the expense
involved, have overlooked the reality that sitting in lecture halls for,
say, fifteen hours a year may not be a highly productive mental
exercise, and have made assumptions about the cause and cure of
professional inadequacies without verifying them by empirical studies. Moreover, mandatory continuing legal education involves large
hidden social costs. The Executive Director of the American Law
Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing
Professional Education has estimated that
[a] state with 10,000 lawyers would require, at a minimum,
$10 an hour for any quality program. If 15 hours a year are the
standard, as in Minnesota and Iowa, the total annual cost to
the sponsoring agencies amounts to $1,500,000, and this is
probably an underestimation. Registration fees would need to
recover, at a minimum, this sum. The cost to each lawyer
would be greater than his tuition, however, since it would include time away from the office and, in some instances, travel
and lodging. These factors escalate the cost projections to substantially higher limits. While initially these costs would be
62

See Wolkin, On Improving the Quality of Lawyering, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 523 (1976)

(a treasure-trove of information concerning continuing legal education proposals).
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borne by the lawyer, they ultimately would be passed on to the
3
public.
Obviously, costliness does not show worthlessness. Still, lawyers
should be closely attentive to the experience of other licensees lest
they end by disserving the public interest they purportedly safeguard.
CONCLUSION

If men were angels, as has been remarked, external controls
over their conduct would be superfluous. Since the most recent
census fails to disclose a significant increase in the angelic population, I do not join those who advocate ending occupational licensing
altogether. Painful economic experiences might ultimately lead consumers of services to locate the most efficient, most trustworthy
suppliers. Meanwhile, however, many persons would suffer avoidable wounds to person or purse. The anonymity of a largely urbanized American society prevents the kind of informed choice which
may have been possible when clients, patients, and customers
could rely with reasonable confidence upon neighbors' opinions of
professionals and tradesmen. For that reason I accept the view that
in some occupations some kind of quality control may be needed to
protect the uninformed against blatant incompetents, wily charlatans, and persons whose past delinquencies suggest the probability
of future corrupt conduct.
Everything is, however, a matter of degree. I am comforted by
the thought that surgeons and structural engineers must pass scrutiny by somebody more knowledgeable than I am or am likely to
become about their qualifications. On the other hand, I think it
absurd to set up elaborate mechanisms as precautions against my
being dissatisfied with the way my hair has been cut, my toenails
trimmed, my muscles kneaded, my hearing aid fitted, or my drains
unclogged. Only the credulous can conclude that licensure is in the
main intended to protect the public rather than those who have
been licensed or, perhaps in some instances, those who do the licensing.6
Id. at 542 (footnotes omitted). See also 62 A.B.A.J. 210 (1976).
In North Carolina, for example, a recent legislative inquiry reportedly disclosed that
thirty-two licensing boards had developed "questionable practices." The three women who
constitute the State Board of Cosmetic Art Examiners paid themselves salaries from $8,277
to $8,913, plus expenses, for meeting "every month for about three days." The Governor's
appointments secretary recalled that some 150 barbers lobbied to be appointed to fill a
vacancy in the Board of Barber Examiners. He was not surprised, since the examiners are
"
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To say that licensing has been abused and overused is not to
say that prophylactic administration should be abandoned. I do not
advocate reviving the doctrine of caveat emptor, nor do I, as a
realist, suppose for a minute that customers and clients who have
been ill served can be made whole by lawsuits against their miscreant servitors. Litigation is too unwieldly to meet the needs of
those who have suffered minor injuries. What are needed are measures that will provide protection against those demonstrably deficient in capability or integrity without in the process creating artificial limitations upon career choices, work opportunities, and stimuli
to provide superior service at lesser cost. Among these protective
measures are permissive certification and mandatory registration.
Permissive certification may be suitable when a program of
prior training or a demonstration of an objectively measurable degree of skill can be regarded as a genuine precondition of a person's
claiming an occupational status. For example, some state laws provide that before a person identifies himself as an "architect," he
must have been certified as one who deserves that title because he
has given proof of his education and capability. These laws do not,
however, bar others from engaging in the work architects do; those
who are uncertified may not call themselves "architects," but they
may do work of an architectural nature without risking prosecution
for engaging in the "unauthorized practice" of a licensed occupation. Certification of this kind permits pertinently defined expectations, so that the consuming public can differentiate between a selfstyled expert and a person whose qualifications have been passed
on by a state authority. Yet, unlike licensure, this control mechanism does not wholly withdraw occupational opportunity from persons who, though unable to meet all the requirements of certification (for example, formal education), may be competent.
A far more comprehensive regulatory device is the simple registration of anyone who desires to receive a particular occupational
license, with the automatic issuance of the license upon registration.
Engaging in the occupation without a license, or obtaining it by
misrepresentation, would be made a serious offense, in order to
stimulate prompt and accurate registration. An appropriate state
agency, not linked with an occupational group, would be created to
receive complaints against licensees, investigate them, and, if objectionable conduct is found, initiate proceedings looking toward revopaid "about $14,000 per year, their expenses are paid (for traveling around the state to inspect
barber shops) and they set their own schedules." Cullen, N.C. OccupationalLicensing Boards
Facing Close Look, Durham (N.C.) Sun, Feb. 19, 1974, § A, at 5, col. 1.
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cation, suspension,
or other appropriate discipline by a court or a
5
.
tribunal
special
A plan of this nature would, I believe, end the present abuse of
licensure that serves selfish interests by constricting occupational
freedom. It would recapture the public power now delegated to multiple licensing boards whose members are drawn from and owe allegiance to the occupations they supposedly regulate in the public
interest. It would require that licensees be subject to stern discipline, but only after carefully formulated charges, fair hearings, and
impartial determinations, untainted by suspicion that the determiners' self-interest has influenced their judgment." It would take
away the eligibility of those whose occupational unworthiness could
be demonstrated, but would not, as so many licensing laws now do,
place artificial roadblocks in the path of work opportunities or
squelch career aspirations by treating predictive opinions as final
judgments.
AsSee also Musolf, Independent Hearing Officers: The CaliforniaExperiment, 14 W.
POL. Q. 195 (1961); Special Project-FairTreatment for the Licensed Professional: The
Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission, 37 Mo. L. REV. 410 (1972).
" Indeed, these requirements may be mandated in some circumstances by the due process clause. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Gibson v. Berrybill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973); Schlesinger Appeal, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961). See also Davis, Withrou v.
Larkin and the "Separationof Functions" Concept in State Administrative Proceedings, 27
AD. L. REv. 407 (1975); Note, Due ProcessLimitations on OccupationalLicensing, 59 VA. L.
REv. 1097, 1122-25 (1973).

